1. I am inclined to believe that M2 is more closely related to business conditions than M1, but have decided to use M1 in most of my analysis because the Federal Reserve tends to emphasize it and because the differences in the recent behavior of the two measures are relatively minor.
Judging the Appropriateness of Monetary Policy
Policymaking is inherently a problem of decisionmaking under uncertainty; an ex post analysis of policy ought, therefore, to be cast in the same terms. Judging the performance of policymakers requires that something be said about preferences for possible outcomes, especially those related to unemployment and inflation; about the effect of events known to policymakers when decisions are made on the odds of various outcomes; and about the impact on the odds of policy adjustments.
Although opinions differ on the relative costs of unemployment and inflation, I know of no statements by public officials suggesting that the current rapid reduction in inflation has been worth the cost in terms of unemployment. On the contrary, public officials have stressed repeatedly that inflation must be reduced slowly in order to avoid a depression, and that the unavoidable cost was a modest rise in unemployment.
Differences over the role of preferences arise largely because of varying views of how the world works. I assign very little importance to inflation per se but feel that the economic and political dynamics of inflation combine to rule out any significant chance of simply stabilizing the rate of inflation at 1973 or 1974 levels. Further acceleration of inflation very likely would have generated vastly increased odds of deeper recession in the future.
I basically agree, then, with Milton Friedman's argument that the real choice is not between inflation and unemployment, but between unemployment now and unemployment later.4 This is an empirical statement-correct or incorrect-about the way the world works and not about preferences. Nevertheless, the tradeoff between unemployment now and unem-ployment later applies only within a certain range. After a point, more unemployment now clearly brings more unemployment later, again for a mixture of economic and political reasons. When firms go bankrupt and are dismantled or fall far behind in their capital spending, an irreversible loss occurs, and production and employment cannot be returned easily to full employment levels. In addition, some government actions taken in response to unemployment, as well as in response to inflation, reduce economic efficiency and interfere with the return to full employment.
I also agree with the Modigliani-Papademos argument that the desirable path for the economy is one involving the fastest possible recovery consistent with maintaining low odds of overshooting full employment and reaccelerating inflation.5 I differ with Modigliani and Papademos not over goals but over the odds of achieving any given target path for the economy. This point will be discussed further in my comments on current policy, but it is central to my analysis of Federal Reserve policy in 1974.
THE EVIDENCE OF 1974
Whatever lessons evolve from the sharp rise in unemployment in late 1974 and early 1975, an analysis of monetary policy in 1974 should be limited to the evidence available at the time the policy decisions were made. The consensus forecast in early 1974 was for a flat economy. Pessimists argued that a couple of quarters of declining real gross national product were likely and optimists thought a recession would be avoided. No one foresaw either a deep recession or a boom.6
By June the forecasts became, if anything, a bit more optimistic. The disruptive oil embargo had been lifted, the unemployment rate was the same as in January, and the index of industrial production actually had risen a bit since April.
From what is known now, the business cycle peak may be tentatively placed at November 1973. However, after a significant decline in the early months of 1974, the economy remained basically on a plateau until autumn. As the year continued, the consensus forecast was revised downward, but 5. See their paper in this issue. 6. It is fair to say that a year ago many economists were concerned over the possibility that maintaining a 6 percent trend of money growth would lead to a prolonged period of economic slack, with unemployment remaining above 6 percent, and perhaps rising slowly, for several years. No one I know, however, assigned any significant probability to a 1975 unemployment rate of the current magnitude. this plateau led most forecasters to believe that any further contraction would be relatively mild. Indeed, even as late as fall, many forecasters anticipated only a moderate recession. The "Typical Quarterly Forecast for 1975"-the median quarterly forecast among twenty-three surveyed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond-had a quarterly pattern of unemployment for 1975 of 6.8, 7.0, 7.2, and 7.3 percent, respectively.7 Since seventeen of the twenty-three forecasts are dated December 1, 1974, or later, it is clear that the magnitude of impending unemployment was completely unforeseen by the professional forecasters, or at least not foreseen with enough confidence to be included in the published forecasts.
Critics of monetary policy in the first half of 1974 point to three reasons why unusually rapid money growth would have been appropriate: exogenous shocks in the form of the oil embargo, and short harvests in 1973; the sideways movement of the economy; and the rapid escalation of interest rates.
Shocks My point is not to offer the Korean War experience as a counter-example, but rather to argue that the case for a more expansionary policy in 1974 ought to rest on more than simply feeding an assumed surge in the aggregate price level into a standard macro model. The underlying micro behavioral equations reflect the holding of inventories and precautionary balances by individual economic units precisely in order to cushion the effects of unforeseen disturbances. The advocates of a policy response to the oil shock ought, therefore, to display some evidence that outsize micro Interest rates rose far more rapidly in the first half of 1974 than would have been anticipated at the beginning of the year given actual money growth. The proper response of monetary policy to such an unexpected change in interest rates depends crucially on whether the change is the result of a financial or a real disturbance. I have seen no evidence suggesting that it stemmed from a financial disturbance.
In U.S. business cycle experience, steady or accelerating money growth and rising short-term interest rates are generally associated with expanding economic activity; similarly, decelerating money growth and falling interest rates are standard recession phenomena. Exceptions are few. Given these patterns, the evidence would have to be very strong to prove that the proper policy response to interest rate pressures, either up or down, is a sustained acceleration or deceleration of money growth. Since the goal of monetary policy in early 1974 was to permit a little slack to develop in the economy to reduce the risk of a further acceleration in inflation, the Federal Reserve appropriately maintained a rate of money growth roughly equal to the average of the preceding several years. In this paper the meaning of "significant deceleration" is defined carefully.
9. These odds were calculated by measuring money growth over six-month periodsDecember-June, and June-December-and then examining all cases between 1952 and 1973 in which money growth was more than 2 percentage points below the average for the preceding three years. suggesting that the significance of the money stock had changed; or, second, that the Federal Reserve is unable to control the money stock and therefore is not responsible for the sharp monetary deceleration. These two arguments will now be discussed in turn.
Federal Reserve Explanations
The Federal Reserve's position has been expressed clearly in two recent statements in response to proposed congressional legislation concerning the conduct of monetary policy.10 A careful reading of these two statements raises questions about the internal consistency of the Board's position. On the one hand, the Board seems to accept the argument presented in the previous section:
We appreciate the fact that an expanding economy requires an expanding supply of money, that any protracted shrinkage of the money supply may well lead to shrinkage of economic activity, and that attempts to encourage growth in money and credit will lead to a decline of short-term interest rates when economic activity is weak.
We are well aware that an expanding economy needs an expanding supply of money and credit and that any protracted shrinkage of the money stock could lead to or exacerbate a shrinkage of economic activity." 11. FRB Statement 1, p. 63, and Statement 2, p. 153. These two statements, however, are less precise than they first appear since "shrinkage" of the money stock, interpreted literally, involves an absolute decline and "protracted" involves a period of unspecified length. Given the context of recent monetary analysis and the frequent reference to monetary growth rates in the two statements, it is reasonable to interpret "shrinkage" in terms of a decline in the growth rate of money. There is no clear interpretation of the word "protracted," but the Federal Reserve has frequently argued that fluctuations in money growth are unimportant unless they last for a year or more. of M1 has been changing. This argument, however, is inconsistent with the Board's argument that it has attempted to achieve faster growth in the monetary and credit aggregates. Finally, the Federal Reserve has argued that it cannot control the money stock very precisely anyway.
CHANGES IN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF M1
The argument that the significance of M1 has changed appears prominently in both statements:
As a rule consumers and businesses no longer hold all, or even most, of their spendable funds as currency or demand deposits. More and more corporate treasurers have learned how to get along with a minimum of demand deposits; a large part of their transactions and precautionary balances are nowadays placed in interest-bearing assets-negotiable certificates of deposit, Treasury bills, commercial paper, short-term municipal securities, and other forms. Consumers, too, have learned to keep excess funds in savings deposits at commercial banks, shares in savings and loan associations, certificates of deposit, Treasury bills, and other liquid instruments, and they shift their liquid resources among these assets. The result is that no single concept of money any longer measures adequately the spendable funds that are held by the public. The FRB statement above mentions even broader aggregates of liquid assets-including Treasury bills, commercial paper, and so forth-but monthly data for these broader aggregates are not published. More comprehensive data are available in the flow-of-funds accounts, but these are not published on a timely basis and are of little value in month-by-month policymaking.
The rate of turnover in demand deposits might also suggest a changed significance for M1. The reasons for changes in turnover-the ratio of demand deposit debits to demand deposits-are not well understood; the average annual rate of increase of deposit turnover between December 1964 and December 1971 was 8. Obviously, new theories and new data could overturn the empirical regularity that sharp decelerations of money growth are associated with recessions, but they also could confirm the empirical regularity. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, the safest course is to assume that M1 has the same significance as in the past.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF CLOSELY CONTROLLING Ml
For some time the Federal Reserve has argued that tight control of the monetary aggregates is technically impossible:
First, H.R. 212 assumes that the Federal Reserve can control the rate of growth of demand deposits plus currency in public circulation over periods as short as 3 months. This we are unable to do. All that we can control over such brief periods is the growth of member bank reserves; but a given rate of growth of reserves may be accompanied by any of a wide range of growth rates of the narrowly defined money supply.'3 Clearly, the short-run relationship between the change in reserves and the change in the money stock has substantial variability. However, the Federal Reserve should be able to offset much of this variability. From reports submitted by member banks, the Federal Reserve has a complete enumeration of daily member bank deposits within eight days of the end of each statement week, and partial data are available even sooner. Estimates of nonmember bank data and of currency in the hands of the public are required to complete the money stock estimates. These estimates are subject to errors and uncertainties, but the differences between preliminary and final estimates are minor compared to the shortfall in money growth in the second half of 1974. Since reasonably accurate data on the money stock are available on a timely basis, the Federal Reserve has ample opportunity to react to undesired trends in money growth by changing the growth in bank reserves. Most of the short-run variability in the ratio of money growth to reserve growth should be in the denominator of the ratio-reserves-rather than in the numerator-the money stock.
In any case, the slowdown in money growth during 1974 came not from a drop in the ratio of money to reserves but rather from a deceleration in reserve growth. Member bank reserves grew at a continuously compounded rate of 11.1 percent over the twelve months ending December 1973 but at a 4.9 percent rate over the twelve months ending December 1974. Moreover, reserves grew at a rate of only 0.9 percent in the six-month period ending December 1974, in contrast to an 8.8 percent rate in the previous six-month period.
The Federal Reserve has argued that its attempts to expand bank reserves may be ineffective in some circumstances:
The Federal While policymakers should consider all available information, the policy of pegging the federal funds rate day by day, and changing the peg in response to observed money growth, is no less mechanical than the policy of maintaining steady money growth, and much more damaging because it leads to procylical behavior of the money stock. To call one policy or another "mechanical" begs the issue. Policy must be based on empirical regularities, and whenever relationships clearly are changing it is appropriate to adjust policy. The Federal Reserve, however, has offered no evidence that economic relationships have been changing in a direction that justifies the policies followed in the second half of 1974.
These not permit interest rates to drop rapidly enough, once they were pushed up, to maintain money growth at a reasonable rate. Indeed, the Federal Reserve seems to accept this argument in the other direction as it applies currently: If, for example, we presently encourage a sharp decline of interest rates on top of the decline that has already occurred in recent months, we would run the risk of seeing short-term interest rates move back up while the economy is still receding. There is, moreover, a very real possibility that, as a result of such a policy, a monetary base would be established for a new wave of inflation in the future and that market expectations of such a development would lead rather promptly to a rise of long-term interest rates.22
The fear is valid under current Federal Reserve operating procedures. Under an FOMC procedure that permits only slow and "orderly" changes in the federal funds rate, money growth is likely continually to be off target as the adjustments in the funds rate lag behind market pressures.
But why should the Federal Reserve maintain these procedures? No possible gain warrants the costs imposed from extensive day-by-day open market operations to limit fluctuations in the federal funds rate. Moreover, this policy has obviously failed to stabilize the federal funds rate over spans of six to twelve months. Excessive money growth over several quarters at a time-as in 1967-68 and 1972-73-may temporarily cushion upward pressures on interest rates, but only at the cost of exacerbating inflationary pressures and raising the ultimate interest rate peak. Conversely, abnormally low money growth-as in 1957 and late 1974-may temporarily cushion declines in interest rates, but only at the cost of deepening recessions.
The Federal Reserve should promptly reform its operating procedures. The FOMC should direct the Open Market Manager to achieve the rate of growth in nonborrowed reserves necessary to attain the target rate of money growth, and the federal funds rate should be permitted to fluctuate without limit. The goal should be to return promptly to a 6 percent money growth path, projected from June 1974, in order to erase the mistake of the second half of 1974. As of April 1975, the shortfall below the path amounted to $7.3 billion, or 2.5 percent. Once back on that 6 percent path, the money stock should be kept there until the economy has recovered sufficiently to warrant a lower trend rate of money growth consistent with long-run price stability. 
